Recent geopolitical events have highlighted the complex dynamics of Southeast Asia’s engagement with global issues, particularly with regard to the conflict in Ukraine and growing interest in joining the BRICS economic bloc. The uneven turnout at recent Ukraine peace summitheld in Switzerland, and the growing interest within the BRICS group amongst Southeast Asian countries, illustrate the region’s broader strategic calculations.
Peace Summit in Ukraine and Southeast Asia
During the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in Singapore, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky called on the countries of Southeast Asia to support the Peace Summit for Ukraine, which took place in Switzerland on June 15–16, 2024. Zelensky emphasized that their participation can be an expression of commitment for peace and diplomacy. Despite this appeal, turnout from Southeast Asia was small, with only five of the 11 countries present: East Timor, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. It is price noting that East Timor was the one country represented by the top of presidency.
Indonesia and Thailand, which attended the meeting, decided to not sign the ultimate communique. The abstention highlights different priorities within the region, with countries comparable to Vietnam and Laos prioritizing closer ties with Russia, while others deal with joining BRICS. Singapore, which has consistently condemned Russian aggression, reaffirmed its position through Senior Minister Sim Ann, emphasizing the importance of upholding international law and addressing the existential threats posed by such conflicts.
Thailand’s participation, represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Russ Jalichandra, focused on the implications of the conflict for global food security. However, Thailand’s recent application to affix BRICS suggests that its economic growth goals could have influenced its reluctance to support the summit’s conclusions.
The Philippines, despite President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s previous contacts and Zelensky, sent a lower-level representative, perhaps reflecting domestic political calculations and broader foreign policy strategies.
Geopolitical priorities and BRICS membership
Apart from the conflict in Ukraine, several Southeast Asian nations are involved turn towards BRICS, motivated by the need to diversify economic and geopolitical options. Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Laos and Myanmar have shown various degrees of interest in joining the BRICS group, which currently consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. This interest represents a strategic move to align with emerging economies that provide alternative platforms for global governance and economic cooperation.
For example, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has expressed clear intention to affix BRICS, highlighting the potential economic advantages and geopolitical balance this might offer. Anwar’s position reflects Malaysia’s technique to remain neutral within the US-China competition while supporting trade and investment partnerships inside BRICS.
Thailand has also formally applied for BRICS membership, hoping to strengthen its economic growth under the leadership of Prime Minister Sretta Thavisin. Similarly, Indonesia, currently assessing the advantages of BRICS, sees significant potential in working with the group to boost investment and trade, particularly from China and India.
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Concerns about over-dependence on China
However, the growing inclination of ASEAN countries towards BRICS raises concerns about excessive dependence on China. Analysts comparable to Dr. Joseph Liow of Nanyang Technological University warn that such alignment could limit the countries’ ability to independently resolve sensitive geopolitical issues comparable to disputes within the South China Sea and the conflict within the Taiwan Strait.
Bhima Yudhistira of the Center for Economic and Legal Studies (CELIOS) in Indonesia warns that the economic slowdown in China could negatively impact ASEAN economies in the event that they change into overly depending on Chinese investment and trade.
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Moreover, internal dynamics inside BRICS, comparable to bilateral tensions between China and India or Saudi Arabia and Iran, pose potential challenges to the bloc’s cohesion and effectiveness. These complexities suggest that while BRICS offers significant economic opportunities, it also involves navigating a landscape of complex geopolitical relationships.
The way forward
As Southeast Asia balances its involvement in global conflicts comparable to the conflict in Ukraine and its economic aspirations through BRICSthe region is characterised by a nuanced approach to diplomacy. The inconsistent attendance on the Ukraine summit and the growing interest in BRICS reflect the varied and sometimes conflicting priorities inside ASEAN. Countries comparable to Singapore and the Philippines are cautious about joining BRICS because of geopolitical concerns, while countries comparable to Malaysia and Thailand are actively pursuing membership to enhance their economic standing.
The way forward for Southeast Asian participation in international forums comparable to BRICS will likely depend upon how these countries are able to keep up the fragile balance between reaping the advantages of economic cooperation and managing the geopolitical consequences of working closely with major powers comparable to China and Russia .
