The Middle East region has long been at the middle of worldwide conflict, and the source of this protracted conflict is Iran’s relationship with the United States (USA), which is one of the persistent and dangerous axes of tension.
Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the 2 countries have been embroiled in structural hostility involving ideological rivalry, proxy wars, economic sanctions and military threats.
However, in recent times, although without major announcements, there was a subtle shift towards diplomacy: indirect talks in Oman and Qatar, a prisoner exchange and a partial easing of Iran’s access to frozen funds.
The article attempts to debate the dynamics of the recent peace agreement between Iran and the USA within the framework of diplomacy and to evaluate its potential for achieving peace and security stability within the contemporary Middle East.
The roots of the conflict and the trail to the negotiating table
However, to know the present peace agreement, it’s vital to revisit the turning point of the conflict in 2015, when Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany) signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Under this agreement, Iran agreed to significantly reduce its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. From a global relations perspective, the JCPOA was a triumph of liberal institutionalism: mutually helpful multilateral cooperation.
However, in 2018, the United States under President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed harsh sanctions, in what Iran called an economic war. The United States also blacklisted the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Since then, Iran has increased uranium enrichment beyond JCPOA limits, reduced cooperation with the IAEA, and strengthened its resistance in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. The two countries have come near clashing several times within the Persian Gulf and Syria.
Now, as we enter the 2024-2026 period, the dynamics of regional security have also modified. The Biden administration (2020–2024), although initially looking for to return to the JCPOA, ultimately adopted a phased approach specializing in de-escalation.
Meanwhile, Iran, under the relatively moderate leadership of President Pezeshkian, faced acute economic pressure and domestic protests and have become increasingly open to negotiations. The result was a so-called mini-peace agreement, involving direct and indirect talks between government officials on the nuclear program, threats of sanctions and achieving regional stability.
A perspective on diplomacy
Through understanding the study of diplomacy, there are a minimum of three principal paradigms that help explain why peace agreements could be reached and why they’re fragile.
First, offensive and defensive realism. Realists view state behavior as motivated by the struggle for power and security.
On the offensive realist According to John Mearsheimer, the United States and Iran are inherently bitter enemies because they’re each regional powers looking for to dominate the Middle East. The US wants to take care of global hegemony within the Persian Gulf to secure access to grease supplies and protect Israel’s interests, while Iran desires to grow to be a significant Shiite power and keep off against US influence.
However, defensive realists resembling Kenneth Waltz emphasize that if the 2 countries reach an impasse through which the prices of war outweigh the advantages, then an agreement will grow to be rational. Currently, the US is overburdened by Ukraine and competition with China.
Meanwhile, Iran, although able to causing chaos, is unable to win a standard war against the US. Therefore, peace, resulting from the exhaustion of long-term conflict, is the most obvious option.
Second, liberalism AND complex interdependence. The liberal perspective proposed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye sees diplomacy not only as a matter of states and military power, but additionally of economic interconnections, institutions and technical cooperation.
In the case of Iran and the US, even without formal diplomatic relations, they share common interests: maintaining oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz, stopping a nuclear explosion within the Middle East, combating drugs from Afghanistan and stabilizing Iraq.
When sanctions are too harsh, Iran’s economy suffers, but the worldwide economy can be disrupted by rising oil prices. Therefore, the recent talks facilitated by Oman and Qatar are a classic example of institutions acting as bridges.
One can hope that ultimately, by opening channels of communication, each countries will have the option to resolve practical problems, resembling prisoner exchanges and humanitarian access, without having to resolve all ideological differences. The more technical issues agreed upon, the upper the political cost of returning to full hostility.
Third, constructivism and narrative concerning the identity of the enemy. The constructivist paradigm, formulated by Alexander Wendt, reminds us that threats are usually not objective, but constructed by ideas, history and identity.
For many years, Iran and the US have built a narrative concerning the existence of an absolute enemy. For Washington, Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism.
However, for Tehran, the United States is the Great Satan wanting to colonize the Islamic world. This identity is so strong that even good deeds are sometimes dismissed as regional political traps.
However, constructivists also recognize that identity can change. Changes within the elite political discourse between countries are crucial.
When Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei approved direct talks with the US in 2024 after previously banning them, it marked a monumental ideological shift in politics.
Similarly, within the USA, when the discourse about overthrowing the regime become a discourse limiting the state’s behavior, dialogue became possible. The peace agreement has a likelihood to survive provided that each side consistently construct a brand new narrative: not about good friends, but about rational competitors.
The impact of the peace agreement on stability within the Middle East
Continuing the diplomatic trend towards reaching a proper agreement on the regional level, resembling a non-aggression pact or limiting uranium enrichment to below 3.67%, can have a big impact on peace and stability within the region.
First, decrease within the intensity of proxy wars. Iran uses Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and pro-Assad forces in Syria as bargaining chips and deterrents.
In a peace scenario, the United States would demand Iran stop its proxies, especially Houthi attacks on merchant ships within the Red Sea which are disrupting global trade. In return, the United States would halt its maximum pressure campaign and reduce its military presence at bases within the Persian Gulf.
This would scale back tensions in Yemen, Lebanon and Iraq, enabling a more peaceful internal reconciliation process.
Second, stability within the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Gulf states resembling Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain live in fear of Iranian missiles and drones. These countries have built a security alliance with the US while also including China and Russia.
Therefore, if Iran and the US reach a reputable peace agreement, the chance of a lightning strike or incident within the Strait of Hormuz shall be drastically reduced. Tankers could then pass peacefully, global oil prices can be more stable, and Gulf states could reduce their massive military spending to speculate in economic and social transformation.
Third, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. This is essentially the most critical. If a peace deal fails and Iran develops a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and even Egypt will quickly follow suit.
The Middle East would grow to be a region of 5 or 6 nuclear-armed states, each suspicious of one another, which can be a nightmare for strategic security stability. A successful peace agreement, subject to rigorous IAEA review, would negate this scenario.
Instead, it’s hoped that a zone free from weapons of mass destruction could be created within the Middle East, paving the best way for secure cooperation on civilian nuclear energy.
Future challenges
The technique of ensuring peace and security stability within the Middle East will not be easy, and the challenges on the bottom remain enormous.
In Iran, hard-line factions inside the IRGC are not looking for to lose their justification for resistance and access to the resistance economy. In the US, the pro-Israel lobby and neoconservatives remain suspicious and ill-intentioned of their belief that the deal is a ploy by Iran to acquire sanctions relief without actually changing its behavior.
It is believed that if there’s a change within the US national government within the 2028 elections, or if Iran’s supreme leader is replaced by a more hardline leader, it’s believed that your entire peace process could collapse instantly.
However, from the standpoint of diplomacy, one thing is for certain: the era of unilateral maximum pressure without dialogue ultimately didn’t change Iran’s behavior.
On the contrary, the gradual lack of constructive dialogue between Tehran and Washington will only speed up Iran’s nuclear enrichment and strengthen the resistance axis. Meanwhile, gradual de-escalation, although slow and stuffed with failures, is the one realistic path to peace.
In summary, the Iran-US peace agreement, if managed with patience, good faith and mutual trust, and with the support of multilateral institutions, can provide the premise for achieving security stability within the Middle East today, not as a conflict-free utopia, but as a commitment to limit conflict in a rational and mutually helpful way.
