Each yr, between one-fifth and one-third of all global maritime trade passes through the South China Sea. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that roughly 10 billion barrels of crude oil and refined products, in addition to 6.7 trillion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas, flowed through the world in 2023.
There are significant untapped resources beneath its surface, estimated at 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
These numbers help explain why seven parties, namely China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia, each bring their very own claims, maps and strategic interests to the identical waters.
Seven overlapping claims in a single strategic sea
At the guts of the dispute are two groups of islands: the Paracel Islands within the north and the Spratly Islands within the south. They are contested not only due to their geographical value, but additionally because control over them enables claims over surrounding waters and associated resources.
Beijing bases its claims on a U-shaped “dashed line” that covers about 62% of the South China Sea. On the official 2023 map, this border expanded to a ten-dash line, which immediately sparked protests from neighboring states.
In 2016, a global arbitration tribunal in The Hague ruled that China’s historic claims had no legal basis under UNCLOS. China, nevertheless, rejected this ruling.
Between 2013 and 2015, China built artificial islands within the Spratly Islands on land, covering roughly five square miles, complete with military facilities, ports and airports. It currently maintains roughly 20 facilities within the Paracels and seven within the Spratlys.
The Philippines claims a big a part of the Spratly Islands, which it calls the Kalayaan Group of Islands, in addition to Scarborough Shoal, which has been de facto under Chinese control since 2012. It is the one country to take China to arbitration under UNCLOS, bringing the case in 2013 and winning typically.
A key flashpoint is the Second Thomas Shoal, where since 1999 the aging BRP Sierra Madre has been deliberately established as a marker of sovereignty. Since 2023, Chinese Coast Guard ships have routinely disrupted ship resupply missions by utilizing water cannons and military lasers.
Cyanide bottles seized from a Chinese fishing vessel in the identical area, confirmed in April 2026, add to a growing list of incidents.
Vietnam claims the Spratly and Paracel Islands, although the Paracels have been under Chinese control since 1974. Vietnam claims more geographic area within the Spratlys than every other claimant.
By mid-2025, Vietnam had established greater than 2,300 acres of artificial land and expanded all 21 facilities it occupied. Many analysts consider Vietnam could eventually match China in total land reclamation within the Spratlys, although its facilities are usually not yet as heavily militarized as China’s foremost outposts.
Taiwan’s claims to the South China Sea largely mirror those of mainland China, including areas inside the U-shaped line. It administers Itu Aba, also often known as Taiping Island, the most important natural feature within the Spratly Islands.
As a result, Taiwan finds itself in a dispute with the identical countries that dispute China’s claims, although they differ on almost every other issue.
Malaysia claims several areas within the southern Spratly Islands based on the continental shelf and currently controls a lot of them. Its claims overlap with those of China, Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan, especially around James Shoal and Luconia Shoals, which Malaysia considers a part of its continental shelf.
Brunei doesn’t claim specific island groups but as a substitute establishes a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone that overlaps with China’s claims.
Unlike other disputes within the region, Brunei’s relationship with Malaysia stays relatively cooperative. Both countries have signed oil and gas sharing agreements and respect mutually agreed boundaries.
Indonesia’s dispute with China centers on the waters near the Natuna Islands, where Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone overlaps with China’s dotted line. Indonesia, nevertheless, successfully concluded an EEZ demarcation agreement with Vietnam in 2022 and has no disputes over the Spratly or Paracel islands.
Why the dispute continues
The 2016 arbitration award is legally binding, but there isn’t a enforcement mechanism. China ignored this decision, and tensions on the bottom persist.
At the identical time, interpretations of EEZ rights remain inconsistent. China argues that the EEZ confers the facility to manage foreign military shipping inside it.
The United States and most other countries hold the opposing view that the EEZ grants rights to economic activities, not military operations. This difference continues to cause friction every time foreign military ships or aircraft operate in the world.
What makes resolving the dispute particularly difficult is the dimensions of the economic stakes. The region’s shipping lanes, energy reserves and fisheries resources are just too priceless for any side to withdraw.
China and ASEAN have been negotiating a code of conduct since 2002, but haven’t reached a binding agreement. During the identical period, all sides continued to strengthen their positions on the bottom.
