Here’s something most individuals never take into consideration: whenever you scroll through Instagram or send WhatsApp messages to a friend abroad, that message is sort of definitely going through a cable at the underside of the ocean, not a satellite.
About 95% of the world’s intercontinental Internet traffic is carried this fashion because undersea cables are simply cheaper, faster and more stable than the rest in space.
You’re reading this because of Cables Under the Sea
Southeast Asia is at the middle of this hidden network. As of 2025, there are 597 energetic or under construction submarine cable systems worldwide, connecting 1,712 landing points.
An enormous a part of this network runs directly through this region. In Singapore alone, there are 17 energetic cable systems in eight cable stations, with a complete bandwidth of over 410 Tbit/s, enough to transmit unimaginable amounts of information every second.
Indonesia isn’t far behind, with over 55,000 kilometers of undersea cable in its waters in its exclusive economic zone. According to Indonesia’s Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, 115,000 kilometers were traveled across the country.
This network is anchored by 4 official landing stations: Batam, Manado, Jayapura and Kupang.
Why Malacca matters
Imagine the Strait of Malacca as a narrow shortcut between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.
The fastest and most economical route for ships moving between them. According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, between 80,000 and 90,000 ships go through it yearly.
Running along all this traffic are the world’s major cable systems, including SEA-ME-WE 5, a virtually 20,000-kilometer cable from Singapore to France able to transmitting 36.6 Tbit/s, and SEA-ME-WE 4, which connects Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Pakistan and parts of the Middle East and Europe.
So much ship traffic crammed right into a narrow strait comes with a catch. Many of the cables laid within the early twenty first century are buried only a meter or less below the seabed, making them dangerously vulnerable to being dragged in by ship anchors and fishing gear.
When something goes incorrect
In April 2024, SEA-ME-WE 5 was damaged in Indonesian waters within the Strait of Malacca.
What must have been 3 days became several weeks, slowed by regulatory bureaucracy, including Indonesia’s cabotage policy. Bangladesh felt this directly, having to depend on its only backup connection, SEA-ME-WE 4, and terrestrial optical fiber routed through India.
Let’s return further, to December 2006.
Two magnitude 7 earthquakes off the coast of Taiwan triggered an underwater sediment flow that severed greater than two dozen sections of cables in eight systems within the Luzon Strait.
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand suffered a communications outage, and backup cables that absorbed diverted traffic were also clogged.
Building resilience
These cascading disruptions from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Luzon have exposed the delicate intersection of geopolitical bureaucracy, nature, and global digital infrastructure.
Recognizing these threats, regional nodes have begun to tighten their maritime policies to guard connectivity. Singapore’s IMDA doesn’t impose any anchor zones within the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
It requires burying cables, adhering to minimum spacing rules between cables and other marine activities, and requires immediate reporting of harm and quicker approvals for repairs.
Indonesia regulates the deployment of cables and pipelines under Ministerial Decree (Kepmen KP) 14/2021.
Malaysia reinstated a cabotage exemption in June 2024 to permit foreign repair ships to repair domestic cables more quickly, a move pushed by tech firms requiring faster repairs.
