The geopolitical dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region have modified dramatically in recent times, marked by escalating rivalry between the United States and China. Amid this power struggle, Japan and Indonesia, two democracies with significant maritime interests, are in search of to deepen their relationship by elevating their status to a strategic partnership and signing a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in May 2026.
However, behind the narrative of a mutually useful partnership, there stays a necessity for a critical understanding of whether this agreement truly reflects strategic goodwill or will ultimately drag Indonesia right into a potentially unfavorable current of great power competition.
Rational logic of partnership
From a realistic perspective, this cooperation relies on several points of agreement. For the Japanese government, Indonesia is a rational partner in Southeast Asia. Japan needs secure trade routes through the South China Sea, the Strait of Lombok and the Strait of Malacca.
Indonesia, in realizing its Global Maritime Fulcrum vision, needs technology transfer and modernization of defense equipment. Japan, constrained by a pacifist structure, sees Indonesia as a perfect “noncombat security partner” to share intelligence and joint training without directly engaging in conflict.
Both countries also share concerns about rapid changes to the establishment within the region, albeit with various degrees of intensity on the bottom.
From Indonesia’s perspective, DCA represents a major diversification of the country’s defense resources. Indonesia has historically been depending on the United States, Russia and China. Given that adding Japan as a supplier of radar technology, patrol boats and possible aerospace technology transfer, Jakarta is a brilliant move to cut back its dependence on the monopoly.
But herein lies the primary irony: supposed independence relies on one other country’s military strategy.
Free and Open Indo-Pacific VS Global Maritime Fulcrum
The predominant criticism of this partnership is the potential for divergence of interests. Japan promotes the concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), which is a projection of the US-Japan security alliance. In practice, FOIP is a technique to contain Chinese expansion.
Meanwhile, Indonesia clings to the doctrine of Freedom and Activity and a more inclusive vision of the maritime fulcrum, refusing to succumb to any power.
The problem is that the text of defense cooperation agreements is commonly unclear by way of operational scope. Words akin to maintaining regional stability and logistics cooperation could be loosely interpreted.
For example, in a crisis situation, if an incident occurs within the South China Sea, does the DCA oblige Indonesia to offer Japanese forces with rights of passage or base facilities? Until threat perceptions between Tokyo and Jakarta are aligned, Japan may view Indonesia as a silent ally while Indonesia only sees it as technical cooperation.
This gap is dangerous since it could create strategic misunderstandings with other state actors, especially China.
The threat of a secret militarization program
In the case of Indonesia, DCA must even be understood within the context of Japan’s changing domestic dynamics. Under Prime Minister Kishida, Japan has made the largest change in its defense doctrine since World War II, including accelerating its counterattack capability and increasing its military budget to 2% of GDP.
Although ten years ago Japan was a militarily secure partner and didn’t pose a threat within the Indo-Pacific, today Japan’s position is slowly changing towards an offensive power.
Indonesia must ask itself: Will this agreement open the door to a more everlasting Japanese military presence in Indonesian waters?
The US-style hub-and-spoke concept of Indonesia acting as a logistics depot or access point for Japanese patrols within the Western Pacific ought to be strongly rejected. Otherwise, Indonesia can be trapped within the position of a buffer state within the face of escalating rivalry between the US and China.
Weaknesses within the domestic sector and political economy
Another aspect that has escaped public scrutiny is the technical details of technology transfer and the defense industry. Japan is thought for its strict licensing system and rigid mental property laws.
In many previous partnerships, Indonesia was merely an assembler or user, moderately than a technology controller. A defense cooperation agreement with Japan could repeat an old pattern by which Indonesia buys expensive weapons systems without the suitable to switch or resell them. This is contrary to the federal government’s ambition to realize lasting independence for the defense industry.
The domination of foreign defense industries, including Japanese technology, through DCA is more likely to stifle domestic research. An unclear offset policy will actually lead to the outflow of state funds without the transfer of substantive knowledge.
This is just not a technique, but moderately a brand new type of dependence on foreign defense technologies.
By signing the DCA, Indonesian diplomacy is ostensibly signaling internationally that it’s leaning towards the Japan-US bloc. While national policymakers have consistently stated that the DCA is just not a military alliance, the fact of perception in diplomacy is more essential than mere statements of intent.
China, Indonesia’s largest trading partner, is definitely deeply aware of Jakarta’s changing strategic calculations.
Therefore, if China retaliates with economic pressure or increases the presence of its fishing vessels in Natuna waters, Indonesia must have mature crisis management capabilities in managing relations between major powers.
Will the DCA, together with Japan, be present to defend Indonesia’s position within the region? This is very unlikely on condition that the DCA doesn’t even have a mutual defense clause like NATO’s Article 5.
In times of crisis, Jakarta will ultimately remain alone, but from Beijing’s perspective it’ll lose some room for maneuver.
The DCA between Indonesia and Japan is just not a fundamentally flawed policy, but when not managed properly, it’s vulnerable to implementation oversights. The Indonesian government shouldn’t grow to be euphoric about getting access to modern technology from Japan without first understanding the geopolitical landscape.
First, Indonesia should make sure that DCA is clearly limited and only covers joint exercises, maritime security and disaster relief, moderately than being rights-based or rapid military deployment.
Second, Indonesia must require binding technology transfer clauses inside specific time frames.
Third, and most significantly, Indonesia must immediately formulate a transparent maritime grand strategy that views cooperation with Japan solely as a tool to modernize the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and never as an instrument to counterbalance China’s power within the Indo-Pacific region.
Without strategic clarity, a strategic partnership through DCA can be little greater than a gorgeous dance on a ship that’s starting to crack within the storm of great power competition. Indonesia must truly be the captain of its national interests, not the helmsman pursuing the ambitions of foreign powers.
