The Mongols were a strong army and conquered large parts of the Eurasian continent, defeating quite a lot of opponents. However, Southeast Asia and naval operations had at all times been problematic for the Mongols.
In 1293 each challenges formed one campaign – the attack on Java; it was a disaster. It was situated on the sting of the world known to the Mongols and turned out to be too difficult. It’s a confusing story, not thoroughly written, however it illustrates what happens when a strong force enters unknown territory and faces an enemy that fights in another way.
Why did this occur? Kublai Khan, ruler of the Mongol Empire, sent emissaries to many kingdoms and countries asking for tribute, and certainly one of these delegations arrived in Java around 1289, to the Kingdom of Singhasari, then ruled by King Kertanegra. Kertanegara felt that Kublai Khan’s demand for tribute was impertinent, so depending on the sources, he had the Mongol envoys’ faces tattooed with hot iron or tattooed and possibly cut off their ears as punishment for common criminals before sending them back to Yuan China.
The Mongols appeared to find any attack on emissaries particularly offensive, so Kublai ordered a punitive expedition against the distant, troublesome king.
It took three years to assemble an invasion fleet of 20,000–30,000 troops, probably mostly Chinese forces, in 1,000 ships. There was also annual grain and enormous amounts of silver. (Paul Michel Munoz in Early Kingdoms of the Indonesian Archipelago and Malay Peninsula, citing unrelated Yuan sources, gives a figure of 100,000, including cavalry). The command structure was interesting with the Mongol Shi-pi, a veteran of the Song Chinese War, in overall command. The ground forces were commanded by the Chinese Kao Xing – probably a difficult enemy Chinese general from the recent Mongol campaign against the Song to defeat. The naval forces were commanded by a Uighur named Ikh-Musu. He was probably there for his command experience fairly than for his naval skills, although China’s most famous commander
The command structure was interesting, with the general command being led by the Mongol Shi-pi, a veteran of the war with the Song Chinese. The ground forces were commanded by the Chinese Kao Xing – probably a difficult enemy Chinese general from the recent Mongol campaign against the Song to defeat. The naval forces were commanded by a Uighur named Ikh-Musu. He probably got here there for his command experience fairly than seamanship, although China’s most famous sailor, Zheng He, also hailed from deep inside China.
The fleet left southern China and continued along what’s now Vietnam. There is a few dispute within the sources as as to whether the fleet attempted to land at Champa and was rejected (Munoz and Delgado), or whether the fleet headed directly for Java (Man). The man goes further and suggests that Kertanegara had already placed forces at Champa to take care of any fleet, so the choice to avoid the place actually worked to the Mongols’ advantage.
Mongol forces arrived from Tuban, Java, probably in early 1293, although I actually have not been capable of find the precise date. It was clear that the journey was difficult and that the military was weakened. Before disembarking, the Mongol commander sent emissaries to know what was happening on land. The envoys were then informed that Kertanegara was dead, killed by the leader of the Singhasari tribute state, Adipati of Kediri, Jayakatwanga, who had grow to be the brand new power in the world. Kertanegara’s son-in-law, Raden Wijaya, made a take care of the Mongols that if the Mongols helped him, he would swear allegiance to the Great Khan. This was probably considered result for the Mongol commanders.
The fleet proceeded to Surabaya and fought a naval battle with the Javanese fleet stationed there. It is feasible that these boats were oar-powered barges that may have wanted to come back alongside and board the Mongol ship. After this meeting, the Mongol commander landed numerous his land forces on an overland campaign, while a fleet sailed to Sumatra to hunt submission from the kings. Although not far on the map, it could take the ships a while to finish this task because the winds needed to be favorable. The fleet also needed to get well quickly to be ready for such a move. The Mongol commander will need to have been very confident of success or of his recent Javanese allies to permit the fleet to drift away from him. The fleet did its job well and secured the loyalty of the Sumatra kingdoms in addition to the royal hostages.
The real ground campaign began with the Mongols moving up the Brantas River valley towards Kediri. Raden Vijaya’s forces allegedly targeted isolated Kediri garrisons, while the Mongols focused on Kediri armies. Jayakatwang’s army was effectively surrounded by the Mongol army from the north and Raden Wijaya’s forces from the east. It was unclear how the victory was achieved, however it appears that the 2 armies were outnumbered and fell in battle in March 1293. Without a military, Jayakatwang remained in Kediri, which had been occupied by the Mongols, and was captured in his palace on April 26, 1293.
It was after this victory that Raden Wijaya played his master stroke. He convinced Shi-pi that he must return to his home district to prepare a tribute to the nice khan. Some sources say the 200-strong Mongol escort was armed, others say it was unarmed. I think they were armed, otherwise they might have had to depart their weapons somewhere, and so they were still moving around areas that had recently been fought over. I think that the story of the unarmed soldiers, if in actual fact a recent one, was spread to discredit Shi-pi for falling right into a trap and never avenging the helpless men on a tribute mission that was the mission’s goal all along.
Mongol forces began a fighting retreat northeast to Surabaya. The men boarded the ships and after deliberation, the Mongol forces decided that further military motion could be counterproductive, in order that they sailed back to China. The expedition leaders probably had some justification, since Kertanegara was dead and the initial insult had been avenged. Kublai Khan didn’t see it that way and had Shi-pi and Kao Xing flogged and a 3rd of their property confiscated, although each were eventually pardoned. Ikh-musu was rewarded for stopping an obvious disaster. The Sumatra hostages were allowed to return home and the Javanese hostages were taken back to China, except Jayakatwang, who was killed by the Mongols through the journey.
Why were the Mongols defeated?
Was failure inevitable? By the law of probability, the invasion was not going to be a positive one, because the Mongols had suffered defeat or encountered serious problems in other expeditions into what’s now Southeast Asia, and other major amphibious operations against Japan had resulted in failure. The Mongols could have had problems with their bows, just as that they had problems with them in other tropical places. This explanation doesn’t seem promising, because the Mongols had already fought Jayakatwang’s forces with no apparent problems.
The Mongols were actually deceived and maybe of their weakened state they were now not capable of respond appropriately. I also think that given their fatigue and the environment not fitting their mobile tactics, and the military won’t have had many Mongols anyway, they weren’t well prepared to take the initiative. That said, they apparently carried out a successful combat withdrawal, as evidenced by losses of roughly 3,000 men, which must have been higher considering that they were withdrawing from hostile territory harassed by Raden Wijaya’s forces. This probably shows that the Mongol forces held together well enough to present a disciplined face to the larger army that followed them.
Source : Asianmil.typad.com
Sources and further reading
